Navy makes the shift back to LSTs, err LSMs, official
At a time when the USN’s big deck ‘phib force is perhaps at its smallest size in terms of number of hulls in the water since 1940, the Medium Landing Ship has officially been announced by the SECNAV.
As many as 35 are wanted by the Marines, although you can be sure that will likely be trimmed to 23-24 (the Marines have only two missile-slinging Marine Littoral Regiments stood up, rather than the three planned, the whole reason for the LSM to exist).
The winner is Damen’s Landing Ship Transport (LST) 100 design, with the “100” being its length in meters. A small ship, measuring 321 feet with a 1,400 dwt (4,000 tons full load) displacement, it is capable of 15 knots while carrying a 1,020 m² RoRo deck, featuring a helicopter pad and space for small boats. Crew size is just 18 men– which means 40 overseen by an O-5 in Big Navy parlance.
They can essentially land a vehicle-based company-sized force, which sets up the interesting scenario of, say, an LSM, LCS, and an older DDG, operating as a sort of “pocket MEU” for non-combat operations other than all-out war (evacs, humanitarian support, exercises, constabulary, etc) — freeing up regular MEUs for more muscular use.
“The U.S. Navy has selected the LST 100 design for the Medium Landing Ship (LSM) program, enabling rapid fielding of this urgently needed capability to our Navy and U.S. Marine Corps team. By leveraging a mature, non-developmental design and strategic engineering, we are shortening acquisition timelines and ensuring our forces have the littoral mobility they need when they need it.”
As Damen is a proven designer and its successive series of 110, 87, and 154-foot patrol boats, built by Bollinger in Louisiana, have been the background of the USCG since the 1980s, with more than 180 delivered. That puts Bollinger immediately in the hunt, and, as the LSM is a simple design, you can bet some commercial firms and also-runs will also try to get in on the build.
It is (almost) always more efficient and effective to buy an existing product off the shelf than to develop one to fit your exact needs. NAVSEA has found that out painfully with the LCS program and the Zumwalt-class Megadestroyers.
Even when buying an existing design, such as done ostensibly with the now-abandoned Constellation-class frigates, NAVSEA has learned that it cannot totally change every compartment of the design, add dozens of new ones, and start construction before this total redesign is even finished.
Off the shelf means little to no changes. Hopefully, NAVSEA has seen the light.
A return to LST normal?
USCG-manned USS LST 66 headed for a hot beach at Balikpapan. Commissioned on 12 April 1943, LST-66 was on her 12 series of landings after hitting the beach with Marines and soldiers at Cape Gloucester, Saidor, Hollandia, Toem-Wakde-Sarmi, Biak, Noemfoor, Cape Sansapor, Morotai, Leyte, Lingayen, and Mindanao, earning eight battle stars. NARA 26-G-4741
Going back to the days of the Overlord, Detachment, and Iceberg landings of 1944-45, the Navy relied on LSTs to get to the beach with an early generation of LSDs/APDs just offshore running small boats to and from troop-laden transports.
This formula continued well into the Carter era, even giving a nod to vertical envelopment as early as Operation Swift Winds in South Vietnam in 1965, using amphibious assault ships like the USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) to rapidly insert Marines via helicopter. Meanwhile, starting in 1962 with the 14,000-ton USS Raleigh (LPD-1), assault transport docks began to appear, with the ability to carry both landing craft and helicopters.
In 1968, the Navy had 7 Iwo Jima-class 18,000-ton helicopter carriers built or on the schedule, 16 Raleigh and Cleveland class LPDs, 33 LSDs of the Anchorage, Cabildo, and Ashland class as well as the 27 Newport and Suffolk class LSTs plus 99 (!) older LST-1156 (Terribone Parish), LST-511 (Caddo Parish), and LST-1 (Blanco) series gators. This was also bolstered by 20 Attack Transports (APAs) and 23 Attack Cargo Ships (AKAs).
No matter how you slice it, that was well over 200 amphibious warfare ships.
The prospect of owning the beachhead was still very real at the time, with the Navy having lists of shallow draft DERs, DEs, PGs, and even 11 LSMRs– 1,100-ton landing ships that had been fitted to fire 240 5-inch rocket salvos at a time.
Then came the building of the big deck 40,000+ ton LHAs and LHDs, starting with USS Tarawa in 1976, and increasingly larger LPDs and LSDs, able to push the landing ships further over-the-horizon and out to sea– safely away from things like Silkworm missiles, fast attack craft hiding in the shallows, and 155mm howitzers on the beach.
Artist’s conception of a very preliminary design of the LHA, released by DoD, 15 February 1967. USN 1120262
This meant the end of the APAs and AKAs, as the bigger LHA/LHDs, LPDs, and LSDs could carry more men and cargo, and the outright termination of the LST, with still-useful Newport class vessels divested at the end of the Cold War (and quickly snapped up by Allied countries, with four of them still active in their 50s). Also gone were the “small boy” escorts that could get in close to the beach with 5-inch guns, as clearly they would not be needed.
By 2003, the Navy was down to just five LHAs, seven LHDs, 12 LSDs, and 12 LPDs (a 13th as a flagship), the mystical 36-ship package allowing 12 amphibious ready groups, each with a big deck LHA/LHD, an LPD, and an LSD, capable of toting around a reinforced Marine battalion with its integrated aviation and support elements (the MEU).
Current figures today are 9 LHD/LHAs, 10 LSDs, and 13 LPDs: 32 hulls, just one more than the Congress-mandated minimum of 31 ships. But that is subjective as the worn-out LSDs are retiring, and incoming LPD numbers are not sufficient to replace them on a hull-for-hull basis.
Worse, there is no, um, expendable, landing ship to put the Marine Littoral Regiment on the beach, which is the stated need for the LSM (we can’t call them full-fledged LSTs now, can we?).
We all know that the LSM will be pressed into other service outside of schlepping MLRs around the Chinese littoral, especially when viewed on their 20-30 year lifespan. Hopefully, it will not come at the expense of the big hull gators, or we will be right back to 1944-45 again, but at a time when the littoral has never been more dangerous, or when we have less control of it.
