Tag Archives: Marine Littoral Regiment

Navy makes the shift back to LSTs, err LSMs, official

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At a time when the USN’s big deck ‘phib force is perhaps at its smallest size in terms of number of hulls in the water since 1940, the Medium Landing Ship has officially been announced by the SECNAV.

As many as 35 are wanted by the Marines, although you can be sure that will likely be trimmed to 23-24 (the Marines have only two missile-slinging Marine Littoral Regiments stood up, rather than the three planned, the whole reason for the LSM to exist).

The winner is Damen’s Landing Ship Transport (LST) 100 design, with the “100” being its length in meters. A small ship, measuring 321 feet with a 1,400 dwt (4,000 tons full load) displacement, it is capable of 15 knots while carrying a 1,020 m² RoRo deck, featuring a helicopter pad and space for small boats. Crew size is just 18 men– which means 40 overseen by an O-5 in Big Navy parlance.

They can essentially land a vehicle-based company-sized force, which sets up the interesting scenario of, say, an LSM, LCS, and an older DDG, operating as a sort of “pocket MEU” for non-combat operations other than all-out war (evacs, humanitarian support, exercises, constabulary, etc) — freeing up regular MEUs for more muscular use.

“The U.S. Navy has selected the LST 100 design for the Medium Landing Ship (LSM) program, enabling rapid fielding of this urgently needed capability to our Navy and U.S. Marine Corps team. By leveraging a mature, non-developmental design and strategic engineering, we are shortening acquisition timelines and ensuring our forces have the littoral mobility they need when they need it.”

As Damen is a proven designer and its successive series of 110, 87, and 154-foot patrol boats, built by Bollinger in Louisiana, have been the background of the USCG since the 1980s, with more than 180 delivered. That puts Bollinger immediately in the hunt, and, as the LSM is a simple design, you can bet some commercial firms and also-runs will also try to get in on the build.

It is (almost) always more efficient and effective to buy an existing product off the shelf than to develop one to fit your exact needs. NAVSEA has found that out painfully with the LCS program and the Zumwalt-class Megadestroyers.

Even when buying an existing design, such as done ostensibly with the now-abandoned Constellation-class frigates, NAVSEA has learned that it cannot totally change every compartment of the design, add dozens of new ones, and start construction before this total redesign is even finished.

Off the shelf means little to no changes. Hopefully, NAVSEA has seen the light.

A return to LST normal?

USCG-manned USS LST 66 headed for a hot beach at Balikpapan. Commissioned on 12 April 1943, LST-66 was on her 12 series of landings after hitting the beach with Marines and soldiers at Cape Gloucester, Saidor, Hollandia, Toem-Wakde-Sarmi, Biak, Noemfoor, Cape Sansapor, Morotai, Leyte, Lingayen, and Mindanao, earning eight battle stars. NARA 26-G-4741

Going back to the days of the Overlord, Detachment, and Iceberg landings of 1944-45, the Navy relied on LSTs to get to the beach with an early generation of LSDs/APDs just offshore running small boats to and from troop-laden transports.

This formula continued well into the Carter era, even giving a nod to vertical envelopment as early as Operation Swift Winds in South Vietnam in 1965, using amphibious assault ships like the USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) to rapidly insert Marines via helicopter. Meanwhile, starting in 1962 with the 14,000-ton USS Raleigh (LPD-1), assault transport docks began to appear, with the ability to carry both landing craft and helicopters.

In 1968, the Navy had 7 Iwo Jima-class 18,000-ton helicopter carriers built or on the schedule, 16 Raleigh and Cleveland class LPDs, 33 LSDs of the Anchorage, Cabildo, and Ashland class as well as the 27 Newport and Suffolk class LSTs plus 99 (!) older LST-1156 (Terribone Parish), LST-511 (Caddo Parish), and LST-1 (Blanco) series gators. This was also bolstered by 20 Attack Transports (APAs) and 23 Attack Cargo Ships (AKAs).

No matter how you slice it, that was well over 200 amphibious warfare ships.

The prospect of owning the beachhead was still very real at the time, with the Navy having lists of shallow draft DERs, DEs, PGs, and even 11 LSMRs– 1,100-ton landing ships that had been fitted to fire 240 5-inch rocket salvos at a time.

Then came the building of the big deck 40,000+ ton LHAs and LHDs, starting with USS Tarawa in 1976, and increasingly larger LPDs and LSDs, able to push the landing ships further over-the-horizon and out to sea– safely away from things like Silkworm missiles, fast attack craft hiding in the shallows, and 155mm howitzers on the beach.

Artist’s conception of a very preliminary design of the LHA, released by DoD, 15 February 1967. USN 1120262

This meant the end of the APAs and AKAs, as the bigger LHA/LHDs, LPDs, and LSDs could carry more men and cargo, and the outright termination of the LST, with still-useful Newport class vessels divested at the end of the Cold War (and quickly snapped up by Allied countries, with four of them still active in their 50s). Also gone were the “small boy” escorts that could get in close to the beach with 5-inch guns, as clearly they would not be needed.

By 2003, the Navy was down to just five LHAs, seven LHDs, 12 LSDs, and 12 LPDs (a 13th as a flagship), the mystical 36-ship package allowing 12 amphibious ready groups, each with a big deck LHA/LHD, an LPD, and an LSD, capable of toting around a reinforced Marine battalion with its integrated aviation and support elements (the MEU).

Current figures today are 9 LHD/LHAs, 10 LSDs, and 13 LPDs: 32 hulls, just one more than the Congress-mandated minimum of 31 ships. But that is subjective as the worn-out LSDs are retiring, and incoming LPD numbers are not sufficient to replace them on a hull-for-hull basis.

Worse, there is no, um, expendable, landing ship to put the Marine Littoral Regiment on the beach, which is the stated need for the LSM (we can’t call them full-fledged LSTs now, can we?).

We all know that the LSM will be pressed into other service outside of schlepping MLRs around the Chinese littoral, especially when viewed on their 20-30 year lifespan. Hopefully, it will not come at the expense of the big hull gators, or we will be right back to 1944-45 again, but at a time when the littoral has never been more dangerous, or when we have less control of it.

Update on Marine Corps Force Design 2030

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The Congressional Research Service just released a well-done 15-page backgrounder on the controversial reformation of the Marine Corps that was announced three years ago. It comes just after the Corps’ own 20-page report on the subject.

The general plan was to basically cut all the heavy and persistent combined-armed abilities that the Marines had in favor of building a few light regiments equipped with anti-ship missiles that could deny ocean space to a threat, generally seen as China, by landing on islands and atolls and setting up shop.

Among the cuts:

  • eliminating all Marine Corps Tank Battalions and associated MOSs;
  • eliminating all Law Enforcement Battalions and associated MOSs;
  • eliminating all Bridging Companies and associated MOSs;
  • reducing the number of Infantry Battalions from 24 to 21;
  • reducing the number of Cannon Artillery Batteries from 21 to 5; and
  • reducing the number of Amphibious Vehicle Companies from 6 to 4.
  • phased out most legacy logistical capability, previously intended for sustained
    land operations

Planned Marine Aviation force deactivations included

  • Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 264,
  • Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462,
  • Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 469,
  • Marine Wing Support Groups 27 and 37, and
  • Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367.
    The Marines also intend to reduce the number of F-35 B and C aircraft in each squadron from 16 to 10

The Marine Corps had more than 450 tanks prior to the deactivation of the tank battalions.
To date, Marine Corps Systems Command has transferred more than 400 tanks to the
Army. The remaining tanks in the Marine Corps inventory are afloat globally on Maritime
Prepositioning Ships and are scheduled for transfer to the Army over the next few years.

In 2020, the Marines divested more than 5,500 pieces of equipment valued at $494 million.

For this “divest to invest” the Marines would get three Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs), delivered ashore by a force of 35 yet-to-be-built Landing Ship–Mediums (LSMs), which are basically just an updated 1940s LCI/LST, although not as heavily armed.

The MLR includes about 1,800 to 2,000 Marines and sailors and includes three main elements: a
Littoral Combat Team (LCT), a Littoral Anti-Air Battalion, and a Littoral Logistics Battalion. The
LCT is organized around an infantry battalion along with a long-range anti-ship missile battery.
The Littoral Anti-Air Battalion employs air defense, air surveillance and early warning, air
control, and forward rearming and refueling capabilities. The Littoral Logistics Battalion provides
tactical logistics support to the MLR. A regimental headquarters provides the MLR with enhanced signals and human intelligence, reconnaissance, communications, logistics planning, civil affairs,
cyber, and information operations capabilities.

In March 2022, the Marines reportedly redesignated the 3rd Marine Regiment as the 3rd MLR.
The Marines reportedly plan to convert the 12th Marine Regiment into the 12th MLR in Okinawa,
Japan, by 2025, and also plans for a third MLR, possibly to be stationed in Guam. The Marines
have not indicated if additional MLRs are planned for regions outside the Indo-Pacific.

For reference, every living former commandant has slammed the plan.

Meanwhile, the Navy is fast retiring its LSDs– with all set to be gone by 2025– and the total number of big amphibious warfare ships is set to drop well below the Congressionally mandated 31-hull minimum as only a dozen LPD-17s, seven LHDs, and two LHAs are active. Plus, you can bet the Navy would grab all the LHDs and LHAs that are F-35 capable to serve as “Lightning Carriers” should things go pear-shaped in the Pacific.

71st West Pac Christmas Drop

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We’ve talked about the long-running Operation Christmas Drop exercise several times in the past.

Besides its obvious humanitarian “hearts and minds” goodwill in stretches of the Western Pacific that often don’t get a lot of attention, it also provides a chance for C-130 units around the Rim to get some real-world training should they be needed to, say, handle low-key resupply for isolated company-sized Marine rocket batteries dropped off on random atolls with little infrastructure but within range of Chinese maritime assets.

Anyway, the 71st OCD just concluded, seeing a few interesting things including seven Herky birds from the U.S. Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force (No.37 Sqn), Japan Air Self-Defense Force (401st Tactical Airlift Squadron), Republic of Korea Air Force (251st Tactical Air Support Squadron), and Royal New Zealand Air Force (No. 40 Sqn) taxi in formation during a multinational “elephant walk” at Andersen Air Force Base, in Guam.

“Operation Christmas Drop 2022” graphic placed onto a C-130J Super Hercules assigned to the 36th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron at Yokota Air Base, Japan, Nov. 16, 2022. The artwork celebrates the 71st annual Operation Christmas Drop which is the longest-running Department of Defense humanitarian and disaster relief mission. Each year, the USAF partners with countries in the Pacific Air Forces area of responsibility to deliver supplies to remote islands in the South-Eastern Pacific. (U.S. Air Force photo by Yasuo Osakabe)

U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Jeffrey Furnary, 36th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron director of operations, uses a radio to communicate with C-130 pilots at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Dec. 10, 2022, during Operation Christmas Drop 2022. 

(Right to Left) A Japan Air Self-Defense Force C-130H Hercules assigned to the 401st Tactical Airlift Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force C-130J Super Hercules assigned to the 37 Squadron, Republic of Korea Air Force C-130H Hercules assigned to the 251st Tactical Air Support Squadron, Royal New Zealand Air Force C-130H Hercules assigned to 40 Squadron, and U.S. Air Force C-130J Super Hercules assigned to the 36th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron sit on the flightline at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam

Seven C-130 Aircraft from the U.S. Air Force, Republic of Korea Air Force, Japan Air Self-Defense Force, Royal Australian Air Force, and Royal New Zealand Air Force take part in an elephant walk to signify the end of Operation Christmas Drop 2022, Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Dec. 10, 2022. 

U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Jeffrey Furnary, 36th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron director of operations, salutes to an Air Force C-130J Super Hercules’ crewmembers at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Dec. 10, 2022, during Operation Christmas Drop 2022. 

In all, the C-130 crewmembers delivered 209 bundles with humanitarian aid totaling more than 71,000 pounds of cargo to more than 22,000 remote Micronesian islanders on 56 islands throughout the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Palau.

This broke last year’s record of 185 bundles.

These included snorkels, flippers and fishing equipment; rice, eskies, containers and cookware; and gifts including colouring pencils, books, sporting equipment and toys.

The box-build process gets a lot of involvement on base from the community, cumulating in a “Bundle Build Day” at Andersen.

After rigging, Andersen’s 734th Air Mobility Squadron and the 44th Aerial Port Squadron (Reserve Component) Port Dawgs partnered to load the 450-pound chute-rigged bundles and service the C-130s for continued sorties.

“It remains the longest-running U.S. Department of Defense humanitarian and disaster relief mission that is supported by multiple Herc fleets from across the region.”

Little Groups of Marines with Switchblades

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One of the most inspiring, and telling in my opinion, modern battles was the morning-long scrap between LT Keith Mills and 22 of his Royal Marines against an Argentine force on remote South Georgia Island. Ordered to give the Argies a “bloody nose,” on 3rd April 1982 his sub-platoon-sized unit did better than that.

Mills’ Marauders

Outfitted only with small arms and man-portable anti-tank weapons (an 84mm Carl G recoilless rifle and 66mm LAWs), they downed an Argentine helicopter and mauled ARA Guerrico, a corvette that came in to the harbor to support the invasion of the British territory.

ARA Guerrico, showing one of her two 84mm holes at her waterline. The other destroyed her Exocet launcher whilst a 66mm round wrecked the elevation mechanism on her main gun. She also had been raked by over 1,200 rounds of 7.62mm. Only the Carl Gustav misfiring prevented more hits.

A great, and lengthy, interview with Mills was filmed earlier this year, as we approach the 40th anniversary of the Falklands Islands War. :

Let’s talk about Loitering Munitions

U.S. Marines with 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), I Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group, launch a [AeroVironment Switchblade] lethal miniature aerial missile system during an exercise at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, Sept. 2, 2020. (U.S. Marine Corps Photo by Lance Cpl. Tyler Forti)

Rapidly deployable loitering missile systems, designed as a “kamikaze” being able to crash into its target with an explosive warhead, are the “hot new thing.” However, as witnessed in the recent five-week Nagorno-Karabakh war, between Azerbaijan– supported by Syrian mercenaries and Turkey — and the so-called Republic of Artsakh together with Armenia (who had the low-key support of Moscow), they are a 21st Century game changer. In a nutshell, the Azerbaijanis claim to have smoked almost 400 high-value military vehicles– ranging from main battle tanks to SAM batteries– with such munitions, for zero lives traded.

The U.S. Army, Marines, and Naval Special Warfare Command have been experimenting with such systems over the past decade, such as the Switchblade shown above. The small (6-pound) Switchblade 300 and the larger 50-pound Switchblade 600 both use the same Ground Control Station (GCS) as other small UAVs in the military’s arsenal such as the Wasp, RQ-11 Raven, and RQ-20 Puma. Quiet, due to their electric motors, and capable of hitting a target with extreme accuracy out to 50 nm with a 100-knot closing speed in the case of the larger munition, they could easily target ship’s bridges or soft points with lots of flammable things such as hangars and small boat decks.

So where is this going?

As perfectly described by a panel consisting of CAPT Walker D. Mills, USMC, along with U.S. Navy LT Lieutenant Joseph Hanacek and LCDR Dylan Phillips-Levine in this month’s USNI Proceedings, possibly to a Pacific atoll near you. In short, while it is nice that the Marines are looking at long-range NMESIS coastal defense cruise missile (CDCM) systems, smaller munitions like Switchblade could prove an important tool when it comes to area denial in a littoral.

Introducing loitering munitions that the Marine Corps can use to strike warships creates combined-arms opportunities—a flight of loitering munitions autonomously launched from a small rocky outcropping could knock some of an enemy ship’s self-defense weapons offline, sending that ship home for repairs or setting conditions for a strike by larger CDCMs that deliver the coup de grace. Loitering munitions also can strike ships at close range—inside the minimum-engagement range for larger missiles. With smaller, cheaper, and more mobile loitering munitions, small units and teams operating as “stand-in forces” can contribute to sea denial and expand the threats the Marines pose to an enemy. The case for employing these weapons goes beyond speculation—loitering munitions have already been used with great effect in recent history and have proved their worth on the future battlefield.

More here.

Access Denied: A New Role for the Marines in the WestPac

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Official caption: “Nissan Atoll, Green Islands, South Pacific, 31 January 1944: Inside enemy territory, a recon party lands, senses keyed up for sounds of the Japanese troops known to be present. A perilous fact-finding mission is underway.” The SMLEs and Mills bombs on the men in the center of the landing craft point to Commonwealth troops in Marine frogskin camo. The non-camo’d fellows at the ramp are likely USCG. A Marine is at the rear

Gen. David H. Berger, who celebrated his 40th anniversary in the USMC and is currently serving as the Marine’s 38th Commandant, wrote an excellent piece in this month’s Proceedings on the subject of “Stand-in Forces,” the pared-down direction the service is going towards in which they can (quietly) seize and hold forward areas with small units to deny access to larger sea forces.

From Berger’s piece:

Small, lethal, low signature, and mobile, stand-in forces (SIF) are relatively simple to maintain and sustain, designed to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area as the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth. Depending on the situation, SIF may include elements from the Marine Corps, Navy, Coast Guard, special operations forces, interagency forces, and allies and partners. This last element is the most critical: every aspect of these deployments must be carried out in close partnership with host nations and partners. Whenever U.S. forces operate in a host nation, they must do so with the full involvement of that nation in conceptualizing and executing the overall mission.

The main ideas behind the SIF concept are deceptively simple. First, find a potential adversary’s people and things (such as weapon systems, sensor systems, submarines, etc.) in a given area, and then track them at a level that facilitates targeting by fleet or joint weapons until they leave that area. This finding and tracking effort starts as soon as the possible target is identified and continues at every point along the competition continuum. Next, SIF must be hard for a potential adversary to find by maintaining a low signature, moving frequently and unpredictably, and using deception. If armed conflict begins, use knowledge of the adversary to help the fleet or other elements of the joint force attack quickly and effectively, blind the adversary, and deny him maritime areas to disrupt his plans and force him to move into other places where SIF and the fleet have an advantage.

Stand-in forces’ enduring function emerges from these straightforward ideas: win the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance fight in support of the fleet and joint force—and do so at every point on the competition continuum.

The full piece, which is a good read, is here.

In very related news, the Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), which recently proved capable of hitting a target in a SINKEX at least, is set to become operational in 2023 with the newly formed 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment. Basically, a pack of Naval Strike Missiles on a remote control JLTV truck platform, the unmanned launcher can be landed by LCAC, LCU, or the planned new Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) LST design as well as (likely) by the CH-53 or C-130.

Naval News talked to the USMC about the NMESIS system, including this gem on why it is remote controlled.

Naval News: Why is the launcher “unmanned” ? Is it because it is intended to be controlled by company (i.e. small) sized Marine units ? Or is it because NMESIS is intended to be deployed on remote islands or locations with no human operators on those islands?

USMC: The launcher is remotely operated in order to enable a smaller, more expeditionary deployable capability. Additionally, remote firing position increases personnel survivability. Marine crews are still expected to be in the vicinity to provide security for the systems.

Food for thought.

A Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System launcher, a command and control vehicle and a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle are transported by a U.S. Navy Landing Craft Air Cushion from Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, Hawaii, out to U.S.S. San Diego, Aug. 16, 2021. The movement demonstrated the mobility of a Marine Corps fires expeditionary advanced base, a core concept in the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 efforts. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps units came together from across 17 time zones as they participated in Large Scale Exercise 2021. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Luke Cohen, released)

Anti-Ship Missiles for more than just the surface combat Navy

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EXOCET MOBILE COASTAL battery uses four vehicles: a TOC, sensor unit, and two four-missile firing units, to put 8 AShMs on shore. It requires just 16 men. A similar concept could be used for the Naval Strike Missile or others. 

One of the facets of the current reboot of the Marines is that they are hanging up all of their armored (tank) battalions and a lot of their (tube) artillery batteries to field small and highly mobile expeditionary warfare missile batteries that would subtly appear on, say a forgotten backwater atoll, and control the sea around it for 100 miles or more in every direction. The nascent Marine Littoral Regiments are still being fleshed out, with an experimental unit formed in Hawaii last year. Nonetheless, LBASMs, or Land-Based Anti-Ship Missiles, are on the menu.

Moving forward with the concept of more (anti-ship) missiles in more places, Big Blue is also weighing putting containerized Naval Strike Missiles on otherwise lightly armed ‘phibs of the “Gator Navy.”

“We have these magnificent 600-foot-long, highly survivable, highly LPD 17s,” said MGen Tracy W. King, director of expeditionary warfare in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. “The LPDs need the ability to reach out and defend themselves and sink another ship. It’s not from the aspect of using them as a strike platform; it will drastically increase their survivability if the enemy has to honor that threat. My intent is to ensure that my desire to increase the lethality of LPDs doesn’t interfere with [Director of Surface Warfare Rear Adm. Paul] Schlise’s efforts to increase lethality on LCSs.”

Finally, there is the concept (thanks for the tip, Philip), recently covered in the USNI’s Blog by LT. Andrew W. Corwell, U.S. Coast Guard, of the puddle pirates adding some batteries of coastal defense cruise missiles to their mix.

Fielding CDCMs provides the Coast Guard with a one-two punch as the service pivots to counter near-peer threats. First, CDCMs would provide the Coast Guard with a credible deterrent to potentially adversarial naval forces. Strategically located near major ports on each coast, a battery of U.S. Coast Guard CDCM Transporter Erector Launchers (TEL) could defend against naval surface threats and be postured to respond to emergent homeland defense missions requiring more firepower than typically found aboard Cutters. Being road mobile would complicate adversarial targeting during a major conflict by enabling the CDCM batteries to operate from both prepared and field expedient positions along the coast while simultaneously providing the ability to surge additional missiles and launchers along anticipated threat vectors.

Second, the CDCMs would offer the Coast Guard an organic, rapidly deployable option to increase the lethality of cutters supporting combatant commanders. Designing the TELs to fit inside the hangers of Legend-class national security cutters (NSC), or the soon to be delivered Heritage-class offshore patrol cutters, integrate with the cutter’s fire-control systems, and fire from their flight deck would greatly increase the ability for cutters to contribute in a war-at-sea scenario, offset shortcomings in desired increases to U.S. fleet strength, and align with distributed lethality concepts.

And to tell you the truth, it all makes sense. The porcupine theory.

Santa, C-130s, and isolated Pacific resupply

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The U.S. Air Force, operating in conjunction this year with the Japan Self-Defense Force, just wrapped up the 69th annual Operation Christmas Drop, tossing out 3,200-pounds of humanitarian aid from the back of a moving Herky bird in 64 bundles over the course of a week to eagerly awaiting communities in Micronesia.

A bundle is airdropped from a C-130J Super Hercules, assigned to Yokota Air Base, Japan, onto Kayangel, Republic of Palau, during Operation Christmas Drop 2020, Dec. 10. By using low-cost low-altitude airdrop procedures, the U.S. Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defense Force were able to deliver humanitarian aid across the South-Eastern Pacific region. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Gabrielle Spalding)

To be sure, it is a feel-good operation. Something to be proud of. Winning hearts and minds. 

However, keep in mind that such drops are real-world training for these same Western Pacific-based C-130 units should they be needed to, say, handle low-key resupply for isolated company-sized Marine rocket batteries dropped off on random atolls with little infrastructure but within range of Chinese maritime assets.

Speaking of which, this year’s OCD was the first that saw bundles dropped on Peleliu.

For those keeping track at home, Peleliu was, of course, a hard-won strategic pin in the map on the push towards Okinawa and the Philippines in 1944-45. The historic island currently has a population of about ~400 locals and the WWII-era airstrip, seen towards the end of the OCD video, is in pretty rough shape.

That beat-down airstrip doesn’t negate the fact that places like Peleliu are getting important once again. Maybe important enough that C-130s ought to be practicing cargo drops there. Oh wait. 

Navy getting back into the LST business…?

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When it came to amphibious warfare across a 60-year-run from 1942, when USS LST-1 was completed, through 2002 when USS Frederick (LST-1184) was decommissioned, the beachable tank landing ship was a key part of putting troops and material ashore for the U.S. Navy-Marine team.

Bougainville Operation, 1943-1944. USS LST-449 loading equipment and supplies from a Guadalcanal Beach for her journey North to Bougainville, in November 1943, soon after Marines landed there. Note the LST’s camouflage and truck in foreground bearing “Cub 9” markings. Photographed by Major W.A. Halpern, USMC. USMC Photo 79815

However, the arrival of the fast air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC) in the 1980s– which allowed for over-the-horizon attacks in which heavy trucks and armor could be landed– made the beachable LST obsolete in the eyes of Big Blue-FMF. This led to the shedding of the LSTs in favor of the big-well-deck LHA/LHD and enlarged dock LPDs, thus keeping the Navy off the beach for anything larger than a 200-ton Landing Craft Utility (LCU)– which can fit in the well deck of a big phib.

Thus:

A landing craft, utility (LCU) assigned to the amphibious transport dock ship USS Green Bay (LPD 20), lowers its ramp to unload a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System from 3rd Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division, as part of a simulated amphibious raid, at Kin Blue, Okinawa, Japan, Aug. 14, 2019. This simulated amphibious raid marks the first time that HIMARS have been inserted by landing craft, utility, demonstrating the Marine Air-Ground Task Force’s ability to conduct combined-arms maneuver from amphibious shipping. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Joshua Sechser)

Whelp, with the move by the USMC to dump their seven companies of main battle tanks, three bridging companies and 16 of 21 155mm howitzer batteries in favor of fielding 21 (14 new) rocket batteries to be fielded by three new “Marine Littoral Regiments,” it seems an ideal means to land such units may just be an LST.

Only you don’t want to call it that, of course.

The Navy has begun looking for a Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) to land cargo/vehicles with the following characteristics (bold added by moi):

*Minimum 5,000 ft2 (1,860 m2) vehicle and cargo stowage space (8,000+ ft2 preferred) on weather deck or with access to weather deck capable of handling static deck loads up to 450 psf, and with at least 13.5 ft (4.1 m) clear overhead or open overhead and a 5-10 MT crane to facilitate cargo and small boat handling.
*Habitability for US Navy crew of approximately 30 + surge capacity for additional 43 Marines or Sailors supporting 11 day missions without replenishment
*Minimum 14 knots Sustained Speed with full cargo load
*Minimum 3,500 nm operating range
*Single point off/on load to beach (e.g. beachable)
*90,000 gal. cargo fuel storage

The design would be fielded fast, preferably by 2023, with commercial and existing designs considers.

Such a ship would be significantly larger/faster than the Navy’s current 200-ton/8-knot LCU 1627-class, and closer to the Army’s 1,100-ton/11.5-knot Runnymede-class (LCU-2000) large landing craft. The Runnymedes are essentially smallish LSTs in all but name, able to carry 350-tons of cargo or 24 20-foot TEUs (96 Quadcons) with a self-deploying range of 6,500nm.

U.S. Army Spc. Michael Breneman signals to a Japan Ground Self Defense Force light armored vehicle during an on load evolution aboard U.S. Army Runnymede-class landing craft utility USAV Coamo (LCU 2014) at Commander, U.S. Fleet Activities Sasebo, Japan, July 27, 2016. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication 3rd Class Specialist Kristopher S. Haley)

As a harbinger of just such a thing, the Marines tested HIMARS missile trucks on an Army Runnymede for the first time last November. 

Everything old is new again.

LST beaching at Cape Gloucester, New Britain, Bismarck Islands, Dec 1943